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THE ENGLISH LIBEL CRISIS: A SULLIVAN
APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARD IS NEEDED
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the landmark case in American libel law, New York Times
v. Sullivan,' has fallen under sharp criticism. Once seen as a great victory
for media defendants, Sullivan is now viewed by many commentators as
having failed to justify reasons for its constitutionalizing libel law. By
pointing to today's huge jury awards and the cost of defending libel
actions, critics say that Sullivan has not cured the inhibiting effect of such
costs upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.2
It is true that litigation costs and jury awards have increased consider-
ably;3 nonetheless, by constitutionalizing libel law, Sullivan has, arguably,
succeeded in promoting "robust and wide-open debate' on matters of
public concern. This note suggests that Sullivan has succeeded to such an
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In this landmark case a unanimous United States Supreme
Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court, ruling that an advertisement placed in the New
York Times by four black clergymen, which denounced the treatment of protesting black
students and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. by police, was libelous per se because it
contained inaccuracies and because, despite the language not mentioning the plaintiff police
commissioner expressly, "criticism is usually attached to the official in complete control
of the body." New York Times v. Sullivan, 144 So.2d 25, 39 (1962).
The Supreme Court ruled that holding media defendants strictly liable for defamatory
statements is inconsistent with the First Amendment freedom of the press guarantees. In
order to protect "the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide open," Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277, the Court in Sullivan held that public officials
are prohibited from recovering damages for defamatory falsehoods pertaining to official
conduct, except upon a showing that the false and defamatory statements were made with
"actual malice-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." Id. at 279-80. More importantly for the purposes of this
note, Sullivan recognized that there is "[a] need for appellate courts to make an
independent examination of the entire record" in order to make sure that the judgment does
not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression. Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of the United States, 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984); see Sullivan, 376 U.S.
at 285.
2. See generally Henry R. Kaufman, Trends in Damage Awards, Insurance Premiums
and the Cost of Media Libel Litigation, in THE COST OF LIBEL 2 (1989); Richard A.
Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782 (1986).
3. See infra notes 53, 54.
4. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
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extent that its creation of an appellate review duty to protect freedom of
speech and press should serve as a model to other countries, particularly
England. Critics are often misled by the frequency of jury verdicts in
favor of plaintiffs and the size of the damage awards. A large number of
suits are weeded out in the pretrial motion stage by application of the
Sullivan standard.5 An overwhelmingly high percentage of verdicts in
favor of plaintiffs are either reversed or the awards are reduced on appeal.6
The Sullivan rationale and authority is most often used by appellate courts
which places upon appellate courts a constitutional duty of independent
review "that is not merely a question for the trier of fact."7 In 1989, two
cases, Sutcliffe v. Pressdram Ltd.' and Aldington v. Tolstoy,' dramatically
illustrated England's rapidly escalating scale of jury damage awards in libel
cases. As in the United States,' 0 the call for English libel law reform is
5. A recent study found that more than 60% of motions to dismiss were granted in libel
actions brought by public official plaintiffs from 1976 to 1984, LEGAL DEFENSE RESEARCH
CENTER BULL. No. 16, 6 (1986) [hereinafter LDRC], and 75% of motions for summary
judgment were granted in favor of the libel defendants. LDRC BULL. No. 4, 2 (1982).
See generally Floyd Abrams, The Supreme Court Turns a New Page in Libel, 70 A.B.A.
J. 89 (1984).
6. Abrams, supra note 5.
7. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984).
8. [1990] 2 W.L.R. 271 (C.A.), 1 All E.R. 269. The court of appeal affirmed the lower
court verdict of October 19, 1989. The jury had awarded £600,000 to Ms. Sonia Sutcliffe,
the spouse of a convicted murderer known as the "Yorkshire Ripper," after a tabloid,
Private Eye, mistakenly reported in three articles that Sutcliffe, finding herself married to
a murderer, made a deal to sell her story to the Daily Mail for £250,000. Id Sutcliffe,
however, admitted that she had accepted £6000 towards legal fees for a separate copyright
suit from a newspaper in return for an exclusive interview and also admitted receiving a
£5000 loan in consideration of an option on her story, which was never written. Richard
Shillito, Libel Developments Viewed from the Trenches, LAW Soc'Y GAz., May 16, 1990,
at 16. Furthermore, evidence of an additional £25,000 loan was not admitted upon appeal.
Martin Mears, The Libel Law: Life After Sutcliffe and Aldington, 140 NEW L.J. 176
(1990). Sutcliffe claimed that the articles suggested that she had lied to police to provide
her husband an alibi. Il It is important to note that there were no punitive damages
awarded in the verdict because there was no finding that the Private Eye knowingly
published this falsehood. Id The entire amount was considered "compensatory." Id
Although the appellate court did not reduce or modify the jury award, the case was sent
back to the lower court on the issue of damages and was subsequently settled with court
approval for £60,000. Id
9. Aldington v. Tolstoy, Transp. Assoc. (Eng. C.A., July 19, 1990). The court of
appeal affirmed the lower court award of £1.5 million to Lord Aldington because of false
war crime allegations in 10,000 leaflets distributed at the university where he taught.
10. Numerous reforms to existing libel law have been proposed in the past few years.
See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 783-84; David A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for
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increasing as fast as the jury awards." English courts, however, unlike
American courts, ultimately decide a high percentage of these libel suits in
favor of the plaintiff." Furthermore, because English libel law has a
strict liability standard 3 and because there is no constitutional guarantee
of free speech, 4 the English appellate courts must find a jury award to
be wholly unreasonable in order to reverse or modify it.'5
The successes of English libel plaintiffs in recent years have resulted
in media defendants bearing the tremendous costs associated with
defending the increasing number of libel suits. 6 The English press
freedom has suffered "the chilling effect" from which Justice Brennan
sought to spare the American press in Sullivan.' Unless dramatic
changes are made in English libel law, this disturbing trend will continue
to abridge English press freedom.
I. ENGLISH PRESS FREEDOM AND LIBEL LIABILITY STANDARDS
The English government has recently come under heavy criticism for
its press restrictions.' These restrictions include the revised Official
Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CAL. L. REv. 846 (1986); Mark A. Franklin, A Declaratory
Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CALIF. L. RE'.. 809 (1986); Pierre N.
Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in Its Proper Place, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1287 (1988).
11. See, e.g., Martin Mears, A Swallow can Make a Summer, 139 NEW L.J. 741 (1989).
Peter Carter-Ruck, one of Britain's most famous libel lawyers, has been one of the most
outspoken critics of excessive damage awards, calling for the court of appeal to be given
the power to alter libel damages awarded by juries. Cathy Jaskowiak, Memoir of a Libel
Lawyer- an Interview with Peter Carter-Ruck, LAW Soc'Y GAZ., Feb. 20, 1991, at 28;
but see Leave Libel Award to the Jury, 138 NEW L.J. 905 (1988).
12. See generally Shillito, supra note 8, at 16.
13. 28 HALSBURY'S LAWS, I 1 (4th ed. 1979).
14. 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS, 834 (4th ed. 1979).
15. Supra note 13, 254. See infra note 112 for examples of the common tests
applied.
16. T. G. Crone, A Newspaper Lawyer's View, LAw Soc'y GAZ., Sept. 4, 1989, at 14.
17. Id.
18. Major international journalist organizations have attacked the British government
for its control of the press. Peter Galliner, Director of the International Press Institute
(IPI), described Britain as "the only blackspot in western Europe when it comes to freedom
of the press," and went so far as to equate British press freedom with that of South Africa
and Chile. Press Freedom-Britain Classed with South Africa and Chile, LAW Soc'Y
GAz., Apr. 12, 1989, at 4.
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Secrets Act 9 and the ban on interviews with both the outlawed Irish
Lord Prosser, the Scottish High Court Judge, recently speaking at the 1990 European
City of Culture celebration, called for nations in the European Community to do away with
.our repressive laws against freedom of expression," while particularly mentioning libel
and obscenity laws. Censorship in the Arts, 140 NEW L.J. 1374 (1990).
Commenting on the press ban relating to the Irish Republican Army, see infra note 20,
the Official Secrets Act of 1989, see infra note 19, and other Thatcher government
restrictions related to criminal trials, American constitutional attorney Floyd Abrams says,
"In toto, it's a frontal attack on civil liberties in the mother country." Craig Whitney, Civil
Liberties in Britain: Are They Under Siege?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1988, at A18.
19. The Official Secrets Act of 1989, which repealed section 2 of the Official Secrets
Act of 1911, became effective on March 1, 1990. David Newell & Catherine Courtney,
Media Law in 1989, LAw Soc'Y GAL, May 2, 1990, at 16. The 1989 Act makes it a
criminal offense for a current or former member of British intelligence or security services
to make any unauthorized disclosure related to his or her work. Whitney, supra note 18.
The Act also creates criminal culpability for the publisher of such disclosure if, when
made, there was reason to believe it would be damaging to national interests as broadly
defined. Id. This enactment is in direct response to the British government's embarrass-
ment over the "Spycatcher Affair." See Howell Raines, Thatcher Uses Muscle to Retain
Secrets Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1988, at 28, (where the government sought an injunction
against three newspapers to prevent them from publishing excerpts from a book by Peter
Wright, the former Assistant Director of Britain's Internal Security Service, as well as any
material from any current or former member of the intelligence or security services).
Barbara de Smith, Broadcasting and Northern Ireland: Constitutional Issues?, 139 NEw
L. 1240 (1989) (citing Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd., [1988] 3 W.L.R.
776). The highest British appeals court ultimately ruled that unless the government can
prove such publishing would result in detriment to the public interest, no such injunction
is warranted. i The court stated that the newspapers' appeals for press freedom were
"of overwhelming weight" and publication would not further damage England's national
security. British Court Refuses "Spycatcher" Press Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1988, at
32. Essential to this decision was the sentiment that because the book had been published
in other countries. See Australian Court Throws out British Move to Block Book, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 1988, at A9. Also, the book was widely circulated in England, further
publication left no possibility of further damage to public interest Whitney, supra note
18. However, the court "left little doubt that had Mr. Wright written the book in Britain,
rather than Australia, it might never have seen the light of day." Id. See also Jennifer
McDermott, Secrets and the Public Interest, 138 NEw L.J. 762 (1988); British Court
Refuses "Spycatcher" Press Ban, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 11, 1988, at 32; see Wrights, Wrongs
and Press Freedom, 138 NEW L. 757 (1988). But see infra note 143 and accompanying
text (for a description of a newspaper's defeat in the latest court battle involving the
"Spycatcher Affair").
Prime Minister Thatcher did not let the "Spycatcher" defeat quell her crusade against
publication of former secret service agents' memoirs. The book Inside Intelligence, by
Anthony Cavendish, was subjected to the same type of legal assault by the British
government. Howell Raines, British Government Seeking to Censor 2d Spy Book, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1988, at 10 [hereinafter British Government]; see also Albert Scardino,
British Bar Harper's on Spy Story, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1988, at A6. The battle to block
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Republican Army and Sinn Fein." Because the British Constitution is
unwritten, English press freedom is incorporated into the common law right
to freedom of expression.2 Critics have cited the lack of definition of
freedom of the press as the root of the crisis facing English press
freedom.22 Although there has been no official press censorship since
1622,23 the press is subject to constraint by issuance of "D" notices24
and, as shown above, by simple administrative notice. Without a written
constitution, there is no limit on a government in control of Parliament, as
was Prime Minister Thatcher's Conservative Party.' Critics urge that
"Britons must recognize that the principle of freedom of information is
based on the public's right to know" and recommend that this principle be
given constitutional or legal protection.
2 6
England's strict liability for libel is seen by media defendants as
another restriction upon speech freedom.2" An English plaintiff is under
no obligation to explain his case except to show that the libelous words
the book's publication was lost "because the Government had acknowledged that it was
not a threat to national security." Thatcher Loses Battle on Former Spy's Book, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 1989, at 14.
Thatcher's actions were met with tremendous criticism and her campaign against spy
books "degenerated into an embarrassing vendetta and has made a mockery of press
freedom in Britain." Raines, supra.
Of further concern to civil libertarians is the 1989 Act's elimination of the "public
interest defense" provision of the 1911 Act, which precluded liability of disclosure to
someone in the interests of the state. "In the absence of freedom of information legislation
it is feared that the new Official Secrets Act will be used as an additional instrument with
which to threaten legal action in order to regulate the dissemination of government
information to the public." Newell & Courtney, supra note 19.
20. In October 1988, the Thatcher government, by administrative notice, barred British
radio and television from broadcasting live or recorded interviews with members or
supporters of the outlawed Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.) and with Sinn Fein, the legal
political wing of the I.R.A. Whitney, supra note 18; Craig Whitney, The Appeal of a
British Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1988, § 4, at 2.
21. 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS, supra note 14, 1 834.
22. Whitney, supra note 18.
23. 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS, supra note 14, 834.
24. Id. "D" notices are issued by the government, and in the name of national interest,
request that certain material not be published. Id. Complaints about material published
are investigated by the Press Council, and the offending publication may be censored. Id.
834 n.11.
25. Whitney, supra note 20.
26. Press Freedom-Britain Classed with South Africa and Chile, supra note 18
(summarizing a report from the International Federation of Journalists ("IFJ")).
27. Patricia Leopold, Publish and be Sued?, 138 NEw L.J. 613 (1988).
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refer to him.' Once the plaintiff shows that the words defame him, the
law presumes them to be false.29 When the tort of libel has been
committed, the law presumes damages.30 Consequently, this approach
allows juries to award substantial sums in compensation for the presumed
harm to the plaintiff's reputation without proof of such harm.3' The
defendant has the burden of proving the truth of the words used as a
defense.32 While the defenses of "absolute" and "qualified" privilege do
exist on the grounds of public policy, 33 such a privilege is rarely extended
to media defendants. 34
Because of English strict liability in libel cases, plaintiffs easily prevail
at trial.35 In fact, in 1989 only one case was tried and won by defendants
and only after the judge removed it from the jury.' Indeed, libel
plaintiff's easy victories in England have become apparent to the rest of the
world. American news organizations that have international distribution
are worried that libel suits will be filed in England to avoid the United
States laws which protect the press by imposing a tougher burden of proof
upon plaintiffs, such as that of Sullivan.37 The former Prime Minister of
28. 28 HALSBURY'S LAWS, supra note 13, 16.
29. Id.
30. 28 HALSBURY'S LAWS, supra note 13, 11.
31. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRossER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 112, at
795 (5th ed. 1984). This was also the approach taken by American courts before Gertz v.
Robert Welkh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Supreme Court held in Gertz that "the
private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than
that stated by New York Tmes may recover only such damages as are sufficient to
compensate him for actual injury." Id. at 350.
32. 28 HALSBURY's LAWS, supra note 13, 1 16; see also Shillito, supra note 8.
33. 28 HALSBURY'S LAWS, supra note 13, 1 3. An "absolute" privilege is a complete
defense to both libel and slander proceedings. Id. Examples are words spoken by a judge
or member of Parliament in the course of their capacity as such. A "qualified" privilege
is extended on "certain occasions" to a person who while acting in good faith and without
any improper motive makes a defamatory statement. Id. What qualifies as a "certain
occasion" is not expressly defined, but, as a general rule, there must be a common and
corresponding duty or interest between the parties making and receiving the communica-
tion. Id. 108. For an example of the court's standard argument for rejecting a media
defendant's defense of qualified privilege, see Blackshaw v. Lord, (1983] 2 All E.R. 311.
34. See Blackshaw, 2 All E.R. 311.
35. Shillito, supra note 8.
36. Id. Although in 1990 two English defendants were actually victorious in the libel
suits filed against them, a very large percentage of plaintiffs continued to prevail at trial;
87% in the year-end summary provided in Mr. Shillito's column. Richard Shillito, Has
Libel Lost its Way?, LAW Soc'Y GAZ, Oct. 2, 1991, at 17.
37. Don J. DeBenedictis, Moving Abroad: Libel Plaintiffs Say it's Easier Suing U.S.
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Greece, Andreas Papandreou, filed suit against 7me magazine in England
rather than in his homeland, where there is no civil cause of action for
libel, or in the United States because "the English law of libel is much
more favorable [to a plaintiff] than the American law of libel. The Prime
Minister, as a public figure, would have a much harder go at it in the
United States," said Leonard R. Boudin, Papandreou's American attor-
ney.38
M. THE EFFECT OF SULLIVAN UPON AMERICAN PRESS FREEDOM
AND LIBEL LIABILITY
Prior to the Sullivan decision in 1964, American courts were in
agreement with the English standard that any libel was per se actionable;
that is, damage was assumed from the "publication of the libel itself,
without any evidence to show actual harm of any kind." 9 The unani-
mous Supreme Court in Sullivan dramatically changed United States libel
law by establishing that state libel laws are limited by First Amendment
principles.' The Court stated that there is no liability unless the
defendant had "actual knowledge or disregard for the truth" regarding the
libelous statement. 4' This standard is required to ensure that debate on
public issues be "uninhibited, robust and wide open."42
Although the Sullivan doctrine applied only to public officials, the
same First Amendment argument was used in Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts'3 to extend the rule to public figures, and even to private plaintiffs
in Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc.," when the Supreme Court held that
"actual malice," as defined in Sullivan, was required to recover presumed
or punitive damages against media defendants.45 It is not completely
Media Elsewhere, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1989, at 38.
38. Id In Packard v. Andricopoulos, English courts awarded jurisdiction in a libel
action against a Greek newspaper with an English circulation of only 50. Costas Douzinas
et al., It's All Greek to Me: Libel Law and the Freedom of the Press, 137 NEw L.J. 609
(1987). Because Greek law treats libel as a criminal matter, punishable by a Dr 500 fine,
the plaintiff escaped to the more friendly arms of the English legal system. Id. Oddly,
Halsbury's states that the English courts have no jurisdiction where the local libel law does
not permit a civil action. 8 HALSBURY'S LAws, 1619 (4th ed. 1979).
39. KEaTON ET AL., supra note 31, § 112, at 795.
40. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
41. Id. at 297.
42. Id. at 270.
43. 338 U.S. 130 (1967).
44. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
45. "In short, the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less
3431992]
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clear whether American courts have extended to all persons the same
constitutional privilege given to media defendants, but the American
Law Institute has determined that a requirement for recovery in any action
for defamation is proof of harm to reputation and that such harm will not
be presumed absent proof of the Sullivan "actual malice" standard.47
Sullivan was the first case to "link the changes in libel law to a new
constitutional approach to free speech issues, one that supposedly broke
away from the old legal formulas."' Justice Brennan's intention in
requiring the "actual malice" proof was "to protect the press from
intimidation or annihilation by money judgements."49 By constitutional-
izing libel law, Sullivan enlarged the role of the appellate courts by
requiring them "to make an independent examination of the whole record
... so as to assure ourselves that the judgement does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression."" As discussed in the
following section, this duty is often used by an appellate court as a basis
for reversal or reduction of jury awards that intrude upon free expression.
The Sullivan rule, however, does impose weighty duties upon the
press. Due to the Court's shifting scrutiny toward the media defendant's
conduct, the court's investigatory and editorial processes, as well as
integrity, are often under attack.5' Several commentators cite this critical
attention as reason enough to declare that Sullivan has failed to achieve its
goal.52 However, such an imposition upon the editorial process should
not be "chilling" to a media defendant, because "getting at the truth"
justifies protecting the press from censorship. What are "chilling,"
however, are huge damage awards that bear no relation to any possible
damage done by a libelous publication and the consequential costs to a
media defendant who must spend incredible amounts of time and money 3
demanding standard than that stated by New York Times may recover only such damages
as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury." Id. at 350.
46. KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, § 112, at 796.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621 (1965).
48. NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MAN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY
OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 243 (1986).
49. Leval, supra note 10, at 1289. Justice Brennan wrote: "The fear of damage awards
... may be... inhibiting .... [Whether or not a newspaper can survive a succession
of such judgments, the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice
to public criticism is an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot
survive .... " New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).
50. 376 U.S. at 285.
51. Leval, supra note 10, at 1287.
52. Kaufman, supra note 2; Epstein, supra note 2.
53. Several high-profile cases provide examples of the incredible cost of libel litigation.
344 [Vol. 13
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fighting these unjustified jury awards.-4 If a newspaper consciously
disregards the falsity of its statements, an award in favor of the plaintiff is
justified. Sullivan properly gives the press the latitude to encourage
inquiry into matters of public concern without allowing reckless journalism.
An honest mistake will not subject a newspaper to liability, but an
intentional attack without basis will.55 This is the proper balance between
the public's right to know and an individual's right to privacy. Unfortu-
nately, English courts have not struck that same balance.
IV. WHY ENGLISH COURTS HAVE NOT ADOPTED A RULE
TO PROTECT PRESS FREEDOM
The reason English courts have not changed from their common law
strict liability approach to libel law to the American standard put forth by
Sullivan and its progeny can be explained by the fact that some of the most
basic American values are at odds with those of the English.
A free American press, despite its flaws, is seen as essential to the
process of public debate and self-government. James Madison said that
"some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything;
and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press."' English
public officials seem to regard the press as sensation-seeking unreliable
pests that fail to provide a public service. "We don't have a great
appreciation that however vile the free press often is, its vileness is
necessary for the great purpose of vigilance that it serves in society," said
Richard Shepherd, a Member of Parliament in the Conservative Party,
explaining the lack of public debate on the government's proposed revision
of the Official Secrets Act.57
See, e.g., Westmoreland v. CBS, 596 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), 601 F. Supp. 66
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984) (combined costs exceeded $10 million
before the case settled). See A General Surrenders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1985, at A22.
54. Even though the risk of ultimately losing a judgment after appellate review is slim
(see infra part VI.), the costs associated with the protracted legal battle have forced
publishers to rethink their approaches toward libel suits. The Wall Street Journal, which
previously had a policy of refusing to settle any libel suit against it before trial, paid
$800,000 to settle a suit in June, 1983. Anthony Abrams, Annals of Law, NEw YORKER,
Nov. 5, 1984, at 52.
55. "Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and it must be protected if the
freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they need ... to survive."
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,271-72 (1964) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 433 (1963) and Sweeney v. Patterson, 76 U.S. App. D.C. 23, 24, 128 F.2d 457,
458 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942)).
56. 4 ELLOT's DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 571 (1836).
57. Whitney, supra note 18. For a further illustration of the polarity of values, compare
1992] 345
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The state of the relationship between the English press and the
judiciary has not gone unnoticed by legal commentators:
The present depth of misunderstanding is sad. A free and fearless
judiciary is a vital bulwark of a democratic society, and so is a
free and fearless press. There is not a judge on the bench who
would disagree .... [However, misunderstanding and dislike of
the press have led the courts on occasion into decisions which are
unduly restrictive of press freedom.58
V. THE ESCALATING SCALE OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH JURY
AWARDS
The tort law of libel has developed in both the United States and
England to serve three purposes: "(1) to compensate the plaintiff for the
injury to his reputation, for his pecuniary losses, and his emotional distress,
(2) to vindicate him and aid in restoring his reputation, and (3) to punish
the defendant and dissuade him and others from publishing future
defamatory statements."59 Traditionally, the remedy employed to serve
these .purposes has been the award of money damages to the injured
party; ' however, the difficulty lies in determining an exact monetary
figure.
61
Additional trouble lies in the tendency of juries to award damages
based not upon compensatory rationale, but solely to punish the wealthy
media defendant.62 The substantial damages awarded to the plaintiff, who
brought an action merely to clear his name and be recompensed for his
loss, are often a windfall to him.6 3
the following excerpts from American and English judges: "Cases which impose liability
on erroneous reports of political conduct of officials reflect the obsolete doctrine that the
governed must not criticize their governors .... [The interest of the public here
outweighs the interest of appellant or any other individual." Sweeney v. Patterson, 128
F.2d 457 (1942). (Judge Edgerton for a unanimous court affirming the dismissal of a
congressman's libel suit based upon a newspapers charge of anti-Semitism).
"I would stress that I do not base this upon any balancing of public interest nor upon
any considerations of freedom of the press. .. but simply on the view that all possible
harm to the Crown has already been don...." Attorney General v. Guardian
Newspapers Ltd. 138 NEw L.J. 296 (1988).
58. Sir William Goodhart, Hared and Contempt-Judges and Journalists, 140 NEW L.J.
787 (1990).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs, supra note 47, § 623, at 326 (emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See generally Mears, supra note 8.
63. An English legal commentator wrote in response to the three successive largest jury
[Vol. 13346
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A. English Jury Awards
To put into perspective the enormous increase in jury awards, the
reader should note that the largest libel damage award to an individual
before the £450,000 in Packard v. Andricopoulos," in June 1987, was
£100,000.65 The Packard award was followed by £500,000 to Mr. Archer
in July 1987,66 then £600,000 to Ms. Sutcliffe in May 1989,67 and
ultimately £1.5 million to Lord Aldington in June 1989." Incredibly, in
only two years, the largest libel award increased 1400%.
What concerns free-press advocates is not the amounts of the awards,
but rather that the figures seem "to bear little relation either to the
seriousness of the defamation or to the extent of the publication."69 The
absence of any award, or even a claim for exemplary damages, in both
awards (£500,000 awarded to a politician/author Jeffery Archer, for an attack on his sexual
morality, see Shillito, supra note 8; £600,000 to Ms. Sutcliffe, id, and £1.5 million to Lord
Aldington for war crime allegations, id.), "[w~hen yet another litigant hits the legal jackpot,
people do not say: 'How wonderful that justice has been done' .... [R]ather they envy
the plaintiff in the same way they envy a pools winner, and at the same time are gratified
that the despised press has been badly stung again." Mears, supra note 8.
64. See Douzinas et al., supra note 38.
65. Id
66. See Shillito, supra note 8.
67. See id
68. See id
69. Crone, supra note 16. To further illustrate the unpredictability of jury awards,
consider the following two cases. In one case, a jury awarded only £10,000 to a union
negotiator that a newspaper falsely reported as drunk while on duty when in fact he
suffered from a motor neuron disorder. See id. In the other case, Koo Stark was given
£300,000 for a false report that she was having secret dates with her former boyfriend,
Prince Andrew. Ms. Stark has recovered damages from newspapers on at least six
occasions since her relationship with Prince Andrew ended in 1984. Francis Cowper,
Press Pays Dearly for "right to Know," 200 N.Y. L.J. 2 (1988); see also Koo's
£300,000-a Sign of the Times, 138 NEw L.J. 824 (1986). Under United States law, Ms.
Stark would have a much tougher time recovering libel damages because she probably
would be held to the "public figure" standard because of her voluntary connections with
royalty. However, the question of when or whether a public figure can become a private
figure is still not clearly answered in the United States. Also, it is possible that Ms. Stark
would be kept from recovering if deemed "libel-proofr because previous libels or true
events may have damaged her reputation to such an extent that no further damage could
be done. KEEroN Er AL., supra note 31, § 112, at 118 (Supp. 1990). See generally, Note,
The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1909 (1985).
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Packard' and Sutcliffe, are further evidence of misguided jury awards.7
In those cases, the entire awards were supposedly compensatory in nature.
This shows that juries are unable to separate their desire to punish deep-
pocketed media defendants from their duty to compensate the plaintiff for
his injury.
Several commentators and judges have realized that juries need better
guidance from the courts.' They propose that the matter of damages be
left completely in the hands of the judges, as done in Scotland."
However, since defamation law has developed to compensate injured
plaintiffs for damage to their reputations in the eyes of their peers, "surely
juries must be more in touch with everyday life than some members of the
High Court bench who may not have travelled on a tube or turned past
page four of the tabloids for some years."74 Nevertheless, a well-known
passage in support of allowing juries to determine damages points to the
precise problem facing the English trial courts today, namely that court
jury instructions do not give proper guidance: "I profoundly disagree with
the suggestion that juries are constantly wrong on damages. If they are,
it is generally the fault of the judge who has failed to give them the help
they need."" A solution for improving court guidance of the jury was
expressed by L. Donaldson in the Sutcliffe appeal: 6
70. See Douzinas et al., supra note 38.
71. See Shillito, supra note 8.
72. Mears, supra note 8; see infra note 73; but see Evlynne Gilvarry, Libel Juries, LAW
Soc'Y GAZ., Sept 26, 1990, at 5 (While speaking at a Bar Conference, Charles Gray said
that, despite the improved guidance to juries since Judge Donaldson's Sutcliffe opinion,
jury difficulties "in accessing damages remain 'huge and such improved guidance is 'an
unsatisfactory compromise or half-way house.'"). See also infra note 73.
73. Mears, supra note 8. Lord Justice Donaldson's frustration with the current system
of allowing juries, rather than judges, to assess damages, is apparent in the following
passage from his opinion in Sutcliffe:
As Parliament well knew, the approach of a jury to any assessment of damages
is different from that adopted by judges. It is not for me to express any view
on which is better, but they are different. Judges are trained, and bound by
precedent, to have regard to awards made by other judges in similar cases.
Juries are not .... Juries do not give reasons for their awards and it is the
common experience of judges that having to give reasons is something which
puts a substantial premium on ensuring that the head rules the heart.
Sutcliffe v. Pressman Ltd., [1990] 2 W.L.R. 271 (C.A.), 1 All E.R. 269, 287.
74. Mears, supra note 11, at 741.
75. Broome v. Cassell & Co., [1971] 2 All E.R. 187, [1971] 2 Q.B. 354, 399 (emphasis
added).
76. See Shillito, supra note 8. An appeal was sought by the defendant in Private Eye
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What I think is required is some guidance to juries in terms
which will assist them to appreciate the real value of large sums
.... [T]he judge could... properly invite them to consider what
the result would be in terms of weekly, monthly or annual income
if the money were invested... in an account without touching
the capital of the sum awarded ....
The court noted that the £600,000 award to Ms. Sutcliffe, if invested
in such a way, would yield £1000 weekly.78
However, despite these suggestions, the result of the Sullivan appeal
is that a judge in a libel case cannot offer guidance on the actual amount
of the award to be given, and neither counsel is allowed to refer to awards
in other libel cases to provide guidelines for the jury.79 When one
considers the reluctance of English appellate courts to disrupt jury
awards,' allowing greater guidance by the trial court judge makes sense.
The trial court could cut down the instances in which the appellate courts
are confronted with the excessive award issue, while still keeping the
award process in the hands of the jury.
B. American Jury Awards
A strong case can be made that the sizes of jury awards in the United
States are more out of line than their English counterparts. However, in
the wake of Sullivan and its progeny, an American jury's verdict and
subsequent damage award in a libel case is much less indicative of the
eventual outcome of the dispute8 ' than is an English jury's determination.
While Justice Brennan's intention in requiring evidence of "actual
malice" in Sullivan may have been to protect the press from the debilitating
on the grounds of excessive award, the judge's misdirection to the jury, and the discovery
of new evidence regarding the E25,000 loan. Id. A new trial was ordered on the issue of
damages only. The suit was eventually settled with court approval for £60,000. Id.
77. Id.
78. However, it has been asked sarcastically that "[i]f a jury did not consider £600,000
an excessive amount, how would they think £1,000 a week would be exorbitant?" P.R.
Ghandi, No End to the Libel Roulette, LAW Soc'Y GAZ., Dec. 6, 1989, at 19.
79. Mears, supra note 8.
80. See infra part VI.
81. See infra part VI., for an overview of United States appellate court trends.
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effects of large damage awards,82 the damage awards by juries have,
nonetheless, increased rapidly. Recent libel awards have surpassed those
in medical malpractice and product liability cases. A 1983 study showed
that the average award of the eighty libel suits studied was $2,174,633,
whereas the awards in product liability and malpractice averaged only
$785,671 and $665,774, respectively. 3 The same study also showed that
libel plaintiffs won eighty-three percent of cases that went to jury trial,
compared to thirty-three percent for medical malpractice and thirty-nine
percent for product liability trials.8 The Libel Defense Resource Center
("LDRC") chairman, who was also General Counsel for Time, Inc., said
at the time:
[he... data... suggest[s] that the principles of Sullivan...
are no longer being applied to safeguard "robust" media coverage
of events of public interest .... As a society characterized by
freedom of speech and free press, we must do more in the years
ahead to regain control over the tidal wave of unjustified and
disproportionate judgments.8 5
Something appears very wrong when the awards in cases not involving
physical injuries are three times those in which death resulted.
In April 1991, a Texas jury awarded a former District Attorney $58
million in the largest libel damage award in United States history. A
Dallas television station was found to have recklessly defamed the plaintiff
by wrongfully accusing him of taking payoffs in drunken driving cases."
Some examples of other examples of "mega-verdicts" include: Guccione
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. ($40,300,000 award at trial; case reversed and
remanded);8 Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd ($26,500,000 award;
trial judge cut punitive damages in half; the Tenth Circuit set the award
82. See Leval, supra note 10.
83. LDRC BULL., No.9, Winter 1983 (from William T. Coleman, Jr., A Free Press:
The Need to Ensure an Unfettered Check on Democratic Government Between Elections,
59 TUL. L. REv. 243, 243 n.110 (1984)).
84. Id.
85. Libel Juries Harsh: Appeals Courts Mild, 70 A.B.A. J. 27 (1984).
86. $58 Million Awarded in Biggest Libel Verdict, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1991, at L19.
The award is being appealed. Id. The jury rejected the defense's argument that the news
report was fair comment on the performance of a public official because it was made in
reliance upon a federal investigation which ultimately led to the indictment of the plaintiff.
id.
87. 7 Med. L. Rptr. 2077 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
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aside);88 and Newton v. NBC (jury award totalling $22,500,000 reversed
and judgment entered for NBC)." If these huge jury awards were
sustained on appeal, they certainly would constitute a tremendous threat to
the media defendant's desire to undertake risky or controversial investiga-
tions and quite possibly threaten the publications very existence.'
More illustrative of the actual plaintiff success rate is a study that
tracked 164 libel plaintiffs through the very end of the legal process; 9' in
the end, after appeal, only thirteen of the original 164 ultimately "won"
their cases with an average award of $80,000.9 The average settlement
was only $7,000, which does not reflect reduction for fees or costs.
Therefore, not counting settlements or reversals, the plaintiff success rate
was less than ten percent. 93  Although academic study and public
awareness of defamation law is at an all-time high and the number of suits
brought by high profile public figures is increasing,' the total number of
suits "dropped precipitously after 1982, due in part to changes in the way
libel suits are processed in the courts."" Indeed, as trial courts begin to
apply strictly the "actual malice" test put forth by Sullivan9 and Butts'
for public officials and figures and the Gertz requirement of a minimum
of negligence for private plaintiffs, the percentage of libel suits will
88. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
89. 930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1990).
90. In one case, the media defendant was forced to declare bankruptcy after losing a
$9.2 million award. Green v. Alton Telegraph Printing Co., 438 N.E.2d 203 (1982); see
Kupferberg, Libel Fever, 20 COLUM. JOURNAUSM REV., No. 3, at 36 (1981). Smaller
publications with limited budgets find their editorial policies dramatically altered by the
fear of encountering the costs of libel actions. Gregory L. Stock, editor of the Jeannette
Spirit, a weekly publication with 2000 circulation, says that the steps his publication has
taken to avoid being sued, include declining to publish several letters to the editor for fears
of libel action, refraining from writing editorials on several subjects of regional and timely
importance for fear of legal reprisals, refraining from investigative reporting, and not
welcoming any information of corruption, malfeasance, and related matters. Eugene L.
Roberts Jr., A Good 7ime to Get out of Journalism?, PHuA. MAG., Sept. 1990, at 77.
91. Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What the Plaintiffs Want and
What Plaintiffs Get, 74 CAL. L. REV. 789, 791 (1986).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. LDRC BULL, No. 16, 1, Winter 1986. See generally Bob Brewin & Sydney Shaw,
Libel Law Then and Now: A Review Essay, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 359 (overview of recent
trends in American libel law).
95. Brewin & Shaw, supra note 94.
96. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
97. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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continue to drop. An LDRC study shows that seventy-five percent of
defendants' motions for summary judgement prevail, usually because the
plaintiff cannot meet the Sullivan standard."
VI. COMPARISON OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH APPELLATE REVIEW
STANDARDS
On August 30, 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed one of the largest damage awards in American libel
history, $22.5 million, in Newton v. NBC." The opinion in this case
provides a good example of how the Sullivan doctrine of independent
review allows appellate courts to set aside jury verdicts, which it feels will
impinge upon First Amendment freedoms. In the years since Sullivan was
decided, defendants have won seventy percent of their appeals. Because
the reversal rate of all civil cases in federal appellate courts is just nineteen
percent, a seventy percent reversal rate "is startling." m®
Newton was brought in 1981 by Wayne Newton after the National
Broadcasting Company ran three stories about a federal investigation of the
celebrity performer's possible Mafia connections. The suit alleged that the
broadcasts "either falsely stated or conveyed the false impression that the
Mafia helped Newton buy the Aladdin in exchange for a hidden share of
the hotel/casino ownership and that he had lied under oath to Nevada
gaming authorities.""0' The district court jury awarded Newton $19
million in compensatory and punitive damages plus another $3.5 million
in interest. The district court judge set aside the $9,046,750 award for lost
wages and the $5 million for damaged reputation and entered judgment
against NBC for $5,275,000.
Because Newton is, admittedly, a "public figure," he was required to
"prove at trial by clear and convincing evidence that NBC and its
journalists made false, disparaging statements with 'actual malice.'"'"
Actual malice has consistently been held provable by evidence "that the
defendant realized that his statement was false or that he subjectively
entertained serious doubt as to the truth of his statement."' 0 3 The Ninth
Circuit assumed the statements to be false and considered the issue of
98. Abrams, supra note 5.
99. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
100. Abrams, supra note 5.
101. Newton v. NBC, 930 F.2d 662, 667 (9th Cir. 1990).
102. Id. at 673.
103. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 511 n.30 (1984).
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"actual malice," which it found Newton failed to prove with the required
"convincing clarity. " '°(
The court recognized that it must carefully balance its Sullivan duty
of appellate "review in order to preserve the precious liberties established
and ordained by the Constitution"'05 with the federal rules of procedure,
which mandate that findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous." By applying this balancing test, the court concluded that,
"although we generally review all purely factual findings for clear error,
when we review evidence on the dispositive Constitutional issue of actual
malice, we are required to be more discriminating in our deference.
" 1°7
The court also noted that, like Sullivan years before it, this case "poses
the danger that First Amendment values will be subverted by a local jury
biased in favor of a prominent local public figure against an alien speaker
who criticizes that hero."*° Because United States courts have recog-
nized that large damage awards can encroach upon the freedom of the
press and that sometimes a jury will not be able to focus on the larger
constitutional issue, they have, in Sullivan, created a legal doctrine that
requires appellate courts to review lower court decisions to ensure the
precious right of speech and press freedom.'°
The English standard of appellate review is quite different from that
in the United States. The Court of Appeal will rarely interfere with the
jury's verdict on grounds that it is excessive or inadequate."' The Court
interferes only if it seems that the jury has been guilty of misconduct or
has made a "gross blunder.""' Several tests have been put forth to
determine what would be a jury blunder worthy of reversal, but all are
virtually impossible to attain.1' 2 In fact, since 1964,"1 no jury awards
104. Newton, 930 F.2d at 720.
105. Id. at 675.
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
107. Newton v. NBC, 930 F.2d 662, 680 (9th Cir. 1990).
108. Id. at 682-83.
109. Id.
110. 28 HALSBURY'S LAWS, supra note 13, 244; Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Pictures, Ltd., [1934] 50 T.L.R. 581, 585.
111. 28 HALSBURY'S LAws, supra note 13, 254.
112. Id. Commonly applied tests are "damages are not so large that no twelve
reasonable people could reasonably have given them," id. 254, and "no reasonable
proportion exists between the amount awarded and the circumstances of the case." Id.
113. McCarey v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., [1964] 3 All E.R. 947, [1965] 2 Q.B.
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in libel actions have been reduced by the Court of Appeal, and only one
case has been remanded to a lower court on the issue of damages." 4 It
is so rare that an appellate court interferes with a jury award, one judge
lamented that "[w]e still have the power to reduce an excessive award, but
can we ever exercise it... ?"115
The major difference between English and American appellate review
policies lies in the English fervent refusal to overturn any jury award,
while such reversal is very common in the United States. The magnitude
of United States jury verdicts, such as those in Newton,' 6 Guccione,"'7
and Pring,'" "[h]ave given impetus to movement for 'reform' of libel
law, while the law itself has increasingly moved in the direction of
appellate supercession of the jury."" 9 However, as the call for reform
heightens in England, the law has stood mute. The reasoning seems to be
that because English libel law is based in common law, as is the freedom
of expression, and the government has refused to guarantee such freedoms
in constitutional or statutory form, the courts are reluctant to become
involved in protecting speech freedoms. They feel that these decisions are
best left to the jury. The United States, however, has adopted a more
liberal attitude toward appellate review when the matter contested has its
origin in the Constitution.
VII. POTENTIAL CHILLING EFFECTS OF CONTINUED
LARGE DAMAGE AWARDS UPON ENGLISH
PRESS FREEDOMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The obvious social cost of libel damage awards is the chilling effect
on the press, which could lead to a reduction in investigative reporting and
reduced coverage of controversial issues and personalities!" Transaction
costs are another consideration in libel cases. This is especially true when
114. Riches v. News Group Newspapers, Ltd., [1985] 2 AU E.R. 845, [1986] 1 Q.B.
256.
115. Blackshaw v. Lord, [1983] 3 W.L.R. 283, [1983] 2 All E.R. 311, [1984] 1 Q.B.
1., quoting L. J. Stephenson.
116. Newton v. NBC, 930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1990).
117. Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 7 Med. L. Rptr. 2077 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
118. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1132 (1983).
119. SHELDON W. HALPERN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBuCrrY AND
"MORAL RiGHTS" 156 (1988).




a jury damage award is very high and the media defendant is forced to
defend itself through the very last appeal.' While, in all probability,
the American media defendant will ultimately prevail by winning a reversal
or substantial reduction at the appellate level, the victory may still cost
millions of dollars in legal expenses and lost productivity.' 2 More
dangerously, a similar English media defendant may avoid these litigation
costs by abandoning investigative or controversial reporting altogether."
A third, less obvious, cost manifests itself "in the form of public cynicism
regarding press accuracy. " ' u This would seem to be especially true in
England, where respect for the press is lacking.'"
Several solutions to the libel law dilemma have been proposed by
reform advocates, including: improved court guidance of juries,'" a
"Right to Reply Bill," 27 the use of personal injury case procedure in
which the jury decides the issue of liability and the judge determines
damages,' 2 and a Bill of Rights to ensure various common law free-
doms.' 29 However, many of these solutions have been previously put
before Parliament by the Faulk's Committee in 1975, and in other
proposals, but to no avail.'"
In light of the clear message from Parliament that damages shall be
assessed by juries in libel actions,' 3' any move to reform English libel
law must be made by the judiciary. Some argue that the reasons given for
121. See supra notes 53-54.
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. This sentiment was also expressed
by Professor Eric Barendt in his inaugural lecture as Goodman Professor of Media Law
in England:
[Ie suspected there might be [a] 'chilling effect' of the law on editors who
reasonably believed a story on a matter of public interest was true and were not
confident of being able to persuade a jury of its truth. He said it should be
urgently considered whether the law should be reformed to change the onus of
proof in libel actions and extend the law of privilege relating to the press to
counteract any such chilling effect.
Shillito, supra note 36.
124. Barrett, supra note 10.
125. See Whitney, supra note 18.
126. Shillito, supra note 8; see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
127. Reforming the Press, Step by Step, 139 NEw L.J. 245 (1989).
128. Libel Law Under Review, LAW SOC'Y GAZ., May 31, 1989, at 3.
129. Whitney, supra note 20.
130. Mears, supra note 11, at 741.
131. Supreme Court Act, 1981, § 69 (Eng.).
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not enacting the European Convention on Human Rights, which was signed
by England in 1950 and guaranteed press and speech freedoms, are now
questionable.'32 Instead of feeling, as argued at the time, that such a
formal declaration, like the United States Constitution, was not needed to
ensure freedoms protected in common law, people now are "wary... that
[the] courts have lost their feel for being a check on government actions,
and that there really aren't any others" 3 3 in the absence of a written
declaration.'
34
The logical answer to these problems is a "Sullivan-like" standard of
appellate review, which recognizes that speech and press freedoms are so
entrenched in the common law that they must be protected from any
damage award that will unduly burden their future use.
VIII. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Responding to the mounting criticism of English defamation law, and
the Aldington135 and Sutcliffie jury awards in particular, the Thatcher
government proposed reform measures.1 37 The central proposal explicitly
empowers the court of appeal to substitute its own damages award when
132. Whitney, supra note 18.
133. Id. (quoting Richard Shepherd, an openly critical Conservative Party member of
Parliament).
134. Id.
135. See supra note 9.
136. See supra note 8.
137. Libel Law Reforms, LAW Soc'Y GAz., Feb. 23, 1990, at 234. The proposals are
delineated in section 8 of the Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990, which took effect
January 1, 1991. Shillito, supra note 36. Of course, there are those who are quick to point
out perceived flaws in this reform:
It is too soon to judge the impact of this important reform but, on the face of
it, it very much undermines the position of the jury. If jury awards are
regularly replaced by a superior court which has not even heard the witnesses
give evidence, it will raise the question whether any real function remains for
the jury in libel actions.
Id.
Nonetheless, should the reviewing court confine its scrutiny solely to the issue of
damages and their effect, if any, upon individual and media freedoms of expression, it
seems that a great need for juries continues in deciding the ultimate issue, liability. See
New Powers for Court of Appeal in Libel Cases, LAW Soc'Y GAZ., Feb. 21, 1990, at 4.
See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
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it believes that the jury's award is excessive or inadequate m38 While the
court has never been expressly prohibited from altering jury awards, it has
not done so since the McCarey case in 1964.139 Although guidelines
have not been put forth for the procedures or goals of this reforming
measure, the consensus is that the results will weigh heavily in favor of the
libel defendant.' 4 Lord Mackay, as Lord Chancellor, proposed that the
court should decide how to exercise its new powers, leaving the role of the
jury intact.141 One hopes that the rationale given for allowing modifica-
tion of jury awards will recognize the direct impact of increasing awards
on the public's exercise of its speech freedoms.142
However, a recent court decision indicates that the English courts are
not yet willing to interpret the government's reform talk as an indication
that speech and press freedoms should be broadened. In early April 1991,
the House of Lords upheld a contempt ruling against The Sunday Times
and its editor for publishing material from the book Spycatcher4 3 while
under a gag order.'" "This judgment has very serious implications for
freedom of the press in this country. It enables a blanket gag to be
imposed on the media, preventing publication of information even when it
is in the public interest," said a Sunday Times spokesperson.' 45 The
court seems to have regressed from its position in Attorney General v.
Guardian Newspapers Ltd, in which the House of Lords denied the
government's request for an injunction to prevent publication of Spycatcher
excerpts because the government could not prove that such publication was
against the public interest."
138. New Powers for the Court of Appeals in Libel Cases, supra note 137.
139. McCarey v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., [1964] 3 All E.R. 947, [1965] 2 Q.B.
86.
140. New Powers for the Court of Appeals in Libel Cases, supra note 137.
141. Libel Law Reforms, supra note 137.
142. Indeed, there is some evidence that the trend of a more liberating view toward
libel liability is growing. The Lord Chancellor issued a consultation paper on making the
defense of innocent dissemination available to printers due to the rapid development of
printing technology and because a printer "need not familiarize himself with the content
of the article as does the author and the professional publisher." New Defence for
Primers?, 140 NEW L.J. 1178 (1990).
143. See supra note 19 (for a discussion of the "Spycatcher Affair").
144. 'Spycatcher' Contempt Upheld, Cmi. DALY L. BuLL., Apr. It, 1991, at 1.
145. Id The spokesperson added that the newspaper would appeal this ruling to the
European Court of Human Rights. Id
146. See supra note 19.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Rapidly increasing jury awards are further compromising the speech
freedoms of the English people, which are already under attack by the
various restrictive enactments of the Thatcher government. 47 Although
developments in early 1990 revealed that the Thatcher government was
willing to give the judiciary the power to take control of the damage award
process, there has been no indication that the government of Prime
Minister John Major will follow through with the reform proposals. In
fact, by recently upholding the contempt ruling against the publisher of the
Spycatcher excerpts, the English courts have indicated that they do not
interpret the government's damage award reform talk as a sign that the
government wants them to broaden speech freedoms. Consequently, the
time has come for the English courts to issue a landmark legal precedent,
as the United States Supreme Court did in 1964 with their opinion in New
York Times v. Sullivan.'" Such a precedent should hold that the English
common law right of free expression is so fundamental to its citizens that
libel damage awards that unjustly infringe upon the enjoyment of this right
will not go unchecked by the appellate courts.
Only after such a step is taken will the press and the public be able to
properly participate in the arena of public debate, which is critical to the
development of a democratic society.
Sean Thomas Prosser
147. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text
148. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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